

not my subject), *potius liceat* . . . I can find no conjecture to hand that convincingly meets the stated expectations. Worth consideration perhaps is Vollmer's *dimittam*; but it does not suggest any reason for the dissociation. Leo (loc. cit.) assumed an ellipsis, writing *iam Nisi* (after Sillig's *Nisaeam*); but *Nisi* (and *Nisaeam*) is peculiarly collocated with *cirin*—or peculiarly separated from *Scyllam*. In fact it seems impossible to concoct out of the *ductus* all that is wanted. (Leo's plan seems to reflect this frustration.) I find the paradosis so intractable that I suggest we allow thought to roam free and consider what might satisfy sense and context regardless of the *ductus*. The beginning of *Georgics* 3 comes to mind where Vergil claims that all myths are hackneyed—*omnia iam uulgata* (*Georg.* 3. 4). It occurs to me that our poet might be saying the same about the various versions of *Scylla monstrum*—not that they are nonsense, but that they are hackneyed. I suggest in fact that he wrote *uulgatum*; that a scribe recalled the Vergilian passage and wrote his parallel *omnia iam uulgata* in the margin. *omnia iam* was then included in the text, and when the time came for metrical surgery, the wrong amputation was made: *omnia iam* [*uulgatum*] *potius liceat* . . . (Quite possibly a similar process of corruption occurred at *Cir.* 175 where †*caeli*† may originate in *Catal.* 3. 2 *altius et caeli sedibus*.) *uulgatum* gives nice point to *potius notescere*—point which it would lack after, say, *dimittam*; and it meets our stated requirements, conveying the poet's dissociation from *Scylla monstrum* and his reasons: 'Scylla *monstrum* has numerous tales told about her and each one is public knowledge (the girl one feels is rather *common*); so, *potius liceat notescere cirin*, and let Scylla in my story not be one out of many girls (being the single storied *Nisi* she will not be); let my Scylla be a *select* heroine.' Of course to say that all the variant versions of *Scylla monstrum* from line 66 on were each one commonplace was probably a very considerable exaggeration; and the comparative freshness of the *Ciris* as a story (also implied) rather depends on when the poem was written and how often in fact the story had been told—neither of which we can confidently say. But the whole stance, whether strictly justifiable or not, is an extremely plausible one for a selfconsciously 'Callimachean' poet; nor would it be a long step to proceed from the feeling that the *Scylla monstrum* story was as a whole now overplayed—as illustrated by the numerous variants that had grown up around the protagonist—to the claim of commonplaceness for each of those variants.

Balliol College, Oxford

R. O. A. M. LYNE

A MATCH FOR ALCESTIS: PLUTARCH *MOR.* 243 d

IN the introductory remarks to his *Mulierum Virtutes*, Plutarch notes the value of comparisons for establishing the diverse manifestations of the same virtue: 'Achilles was brave in one way, Ajax in another; and the intelligence of Odysseus differed from that of Nestor, nor were Cato and Agesilaus just in the same way, nor was Irene loving of her husband (*φίλανδρος*) as Alcestis was, nor Cornelia high-minded in the manner of Olympias' (243d). All the examples are well known, and quite apposite, except for Irene (*Εἰρήνη*). Who is this

paragon of wifely love? A search through encyclopedias and mythological handbooks proves fruitless. Wytttenbach in his note ad loc. suggested the courtesan friend of a minor Ptolemy killed at Ephesus (Athen. 13. 593 a–b), yet this extremely obscure figure hardly merits mention in the same breath with Alcestis. The name must be corrupt. The correct reading becomes apparent from a passage in Aelian's *De natura animalium* 1. 15. After describing how a certain fish, the female wrasse (κόσσυφος), will follow her mate to his death, he asks, 'What will the poets who are always holding up to us Evadne the daughter of Iphis and Alcestis the daughter of Pelias say to this?' The virtue common to the wrasse, Evadne, and Alcestis is of course *φιλανδρία*. Evadne's story, like Alcestis', is known to us from Euripides, who in a dramatic scene of the *Suppliants* (985–1072) presents her leaping upon the pyre of her husband Capaneus. Evadne's sacrifice was well known in antiquity: it is frequently mentioned by Ovid (e.g. *Ars Am.* 3. 21–2, *Trist.* 5. 14. 38, *Pont.* 3. 1. 111) and other Romans,¹ and a painting of the scene is described by Philostratus, *Imag.* 2. 30. Unlike other names associated with female devotion, such as Penelope or Laodamia, Evadne is quite similar to Eirene, and their confusion represents one of the commonest types of palaeographical error: the substitution of one word—here a name—for another (cf. A. Dain, *Les Manuscrits* [Paris, 1964], 42–3). The error was no doubt aided by the prevalence of Irene as a name in Byzantine times. Evadne therefore should be restored to her rightful place beside Alcestis in *Mor.* 243 d.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

PHILIP A. STADTER

¹ M. Winterbottom points out to me that the elder Seneca three times sets the deeds of Evadne and Alcestis side by side, though

without giving the name of either. *Contr.* 2. 2. 1, 2. 5. 8, and 10. 3. 2.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, *DE FATO* 190. 26 ff.¹

τῷ γὰρ τοῦτο πεπιστευκóτι οὐκ ἐπιτιμῆσαι τι, οὐκ ἐπαινέσαι τινα . . . οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν οἷόν τε τῶν ὀφειλομένων εὐλόγως γίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ὧν ποιοῦσιν τὴν ἐξουσίαν πεπιστευκóτων.

πεπιστευκóτι Schwarz: πεπιστευμένῳ codd.

ALEXANDER is arguing that our responsibility for what we do (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is grounded in the fact that a man is the ἀρχή of his own actions (cf. Aristotle, *E.N.* 3. 1111^a21, 1112^b31, etc.). The opponents of this view, he says, hold that nothing performed by a man is such that at the time when he does something he also has the possibility of not doing it, πιστεύσαντες τῷ μηδὲν τῶν γινόμενων ὑπὸ τινος οὕτως γίνεσθαι, ὥς καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν αὐτὸ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντος τότε (190. 24–6). One who believes this, he argues, cannot make any moral judgements or do any of the things 'which ought reasonably to be brought

¹ All references are to the page and line of Ivo Bruns's edition, 'Alexandri Aphrodisi-

ensis Scripta minora': *Supplementum Aristotelicum* ii. 2 (Berlin Academy, 1892).